These are some coments about the military intervention of Libya by the Security Council of the United Nations (U.N.S.C.). I will let aside any discussion about the strategic motivations behind the intervention although the latter allow us to understand why Libya, why not say Bahrain where similar repression has taken place. The latter is a discussion about how justice from the international community is applied in discriminate ways as to serve interests ranging from corporative to internal politics. Instead, I will address the rather isolated issue of the suitability of U.N. military intervention in Libya in the context of the defense of human rights and the recognition of the freedom of locals to drive their own political history.
When rebels are few, the international community doesn't bother to make military interventions. When rebels are the clear majority and they are in military disadvantage the "international community" does not hesitate to intervene as long as the ideological identity of the rebels is sympathetic. The situation in Libya seems slightly more complicated. Although fear has certainly shrink the number of civilians participating in the Libyan revolts (military prevention was crucial in Egipt), it is seems probable that pro-Qaddafi forces are roughly as much as the opposition. Very little international attention has been made to this point perhaps because military asymmetry quickly became the leading criteria to question Qaddafi's respond. Nevertheless the former is an issue that sooner or later will be decisive in the legitimacy of the international military intervention. Another important point is the uncertain ideological composition of the rebels. Although from an humanitarian perspective this should not be a strong criteria, in practice it is because the precedent of a new Qaddafi brought by the grace of western force is becoming an increasingly frustrating scenario. We should not forget that this has been used before to mobilize the west while at the end expectations has not been fulfilled (see Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran). To which extent is legitimate to intervene in a civil war taking side for the ideologically sympathetic? a fare fight is crucial in the process of legitimizing the outcome. Losers might not be happy but if the fight is balanced they will accept it at least to a greater extent than for an unbalanced fight. Qaddafi's indiscriminate use of military power created an unbalance fight. To this situation the U.N.S.C. can respond by using its superior military power to make the war more balanced, but ideally, not to the extent of making it unbalanced in the opposite direction. The ideal sceneario is unlikely; if the war becomes balanced and after "withdrawal" of international forces the pro-qaddafi forces approach victory; then the genocide threat which motivated intervention in first place will probably happen after all. This is a scenario that the U.N.S.C. will never accept. After the strong attacks from the french and the americans, it is unlikely that the U.N.S.C. will dissimulate successfully his resolute support to the Libyan rebels, especially in a war whose outcome has already been written.
